INTRODUCTION
After the downfall of state socialism at the turn of the 1990s, the former communist countries started to introduce market economy. Was it a return to a -natural‖ order of things, artificially destroyed by forty to seventy years of attempts to maintain a command economy? Or did the (re)introduction of markets demanded conscious efforts of constructing new institutions from above, and of persuading people that, however different the new order from what they were accustomed to, and however painful the transition in the short term, it is for their own good in the long run? If persuasion was needed, to whom was it to be addressed, and what sort of arguments was to be used? Was it important in terms of facilitating the market transition?
This paper looks at one case of such rhetoric, of the Warsaw daily Gazeta Wyborcza. 1 The choice is not accidental. The paper, established in May 1989, became to play the leading role among the Polish paper media for many years to come, first as the only independent daily in the decomposing communist bloc, and then as perhaps the most important daily not only in Poland, but in all East Central Europe, if judged by circulation and by influence. Created by former opposition activists close to the Solidarity Trade Union, it became an unequivocal supporter of the market transition and perhaps the most important pro-market opinion making platform.
Thus, it was in a position to shape the discourse on market transition in Poland by influencing the way of thinking of its readership. The period under investigation is 1989-1993. This is a time of rule of the first non-communist cabinet, formed by the Solidarity camp, and also a period of economic recession, accompanying the beginnings of economic reforms.
This small case study is set against a broader theoretical and historical context of a problem of -natural‖ vs. -constructed‖ character of the market order. This is analyzed in section 2. Section 3 sketches briefly these aspects of the Polish transformation which are relevant for understanding the Gazeta position. Section 4 describes the political context and the place of Gazeta within it. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the paper pro-market argument and rhetoric.
IS MARKET NATURAL?
The question how "natural‖ is market is a long-standing issue in the social sciences. Adam Smith built much of his argument upon the assumption that humans have a natural -propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.‖ 2 The emergence of some forms of primitive class, contrasts -the older moral economy‖ and -a model of ‗natural' and self-adjusting political economy which, left unrestrained, would operate to the benefit of employers and employed alike.‖ 6 The first was a legacy of pre-capitalist, paternalistic relations and assumed a right for survival for every member of the community. The second was not so much -natural,‖ as constructed by the state through the gradual reforms of the Poor Laws, supported by the arguments of classical economists, particularly R. T. Malthus, according to whom nothing could be done to increase the wages above the biological minimum. In the words of Karl Polanyi,
- [t] here was nothing natural about the laissez-faire, free markets could have never come into being merely by allowing things to take their course.‖ 7 His principal argument is of the market system developing in the 19 th century in leaps and bounds: -the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions.‖ 8 As a total commodification of labor (i.e., human beings) would lead to the destruction of society, the society was reacting by looking for labor protection. such their shape which would lead to the possibly most efficient use of resources. Its suggestion is that if -people being rational utility maximizers -there is a proper incentive structure, than high efficiency would follow. Much of the post-communist transformation to a market economy has been built upon this assumption.
But there were doubts of the feasibility of realizing this project in a fast way. Not only formal institutions were missing, but societies living for forty to seventy years under state socialism were hardly prepared for the -jump to the market economy.‖ 11 The perceptions, mental
habits, values, attitudes, practices were of a different kind than those formed under several centuries of market and capitalism. Informal institutions and cultural patterns might have prevailed over new regulations, path dependency derailing a society from the route to a market economy.
Thus, those convinced about a natural and positive character of the market order thought at the same time that not all the people shared their views and that these people had to be persuaded if the market reform was to succeed. In an ironic twist of history, they found themselves in a situation similar to that of the Marxists several decades before, who -while convinced that workers of all nations had objectively the same interests -thought it necessary to shout -Workers of the world, unite!‖
In the particular case of Poland, the task that the intellectuals committed to market transformation had set to themselves was not an abstract argument in favor of markets in general, but rather an argument in favor of concrete reforms, undertook in specific conditions and leading -in a short run -to the consequences painful for the large segments of the public.
Thus, the intellectuals had to explain why this suffering was necessary for the public benefit in the future. The jump, however -contrary to simplified opinions -was not from -command to market.‖ The social experience preceding the jump was much more complex. Rostowski and Stanislaw Gomułka. 16 Kowalik took also into consideration the role of the IMF in shaping the Polish reforms. According to his interpretation, the pro-market economists managed to persuade people like Mazowiecki, Kuroń, and also Bronisław Geremek, the chief of Solidarity caucus in the parliament, and Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza and one of the major political figures at the time, that the course of action they proposed is the only possible one.
For the question how was it possible for the Solidarity Trade Union to accept the package which run against the immediate interests of the workers, Kowalik answers that it was because during the 1980s the Union, and particularly its leadership, transformed from labor organization into political movement whose main preoccupation was to contest the communist system. This view is similar to that of David Ost, who interprets the Polish developments in class-like terms and argues that the Union leadership already in the late eighties was keen to demobilize labor, interested in its support only insofar as it allowed them to press the communists politically. Thus the labor issues sensu stricto became secondary for the leadership. After the breakthrough, the Union leadership strengthened its demobilizing policies, this time in order to provide -an umbrella‖ for the Balcerowicz Plan.
17
A few caveats are necessary for the -shock therapy‖ label. In fact, the process of transformation towards the market had indeed started earlier; in some way even so far back as the mid-fifties, if the subsequent efforts to introduce elements of market into the socialist economy 15 Kowalik, op. cit. 16 On the latter, see also the external liberalization (abolishing the state monopoly in foreign trade) and initiated the privatization process. Of enormous importance had been also the rhetorical and symbolical shift -no more talking about reforming the state socialism, instead the building -the market economy‖ was set as a task. But the 1989 reforms were only the beginning of the beginning of the institutional change. There were to be followed not only by privatization, but also by reintroduction of the commercial code, by the banking reform, by the establishment of stock exchange, by the tax reforms, and so on and so on. These processes were to take several years, and since the mid-nineties they were more and more shaped by the expectations of the accession to the European Union.
One part of the Balcerowicz package, however, had immediate consequences. These were the stabilization measures. It does not seem that the government could act in a more gradual way in this respect, taking into consideration as much the external debt as the internal imbalances. Freeing food prices in 1989, without putting the brakes on wages and cutting subsidies for SOE triggered the inflation spiral. Under the Balcerowicz Plan, almost all remaining prices were made free, but the subsidies were reduced drastically. In addition, a special tax was put on the excessive wage rises in SOE, to stop the inflationary spiral. The fixed exchange rate for the Polish Zloty had been introduced, to achieve yet another anti-inflationary anchor.
The consequences were immediate, and in the short term mostly unpleasant for the wider public. Prices jumped sevenfold over 1990 in the wave of correctional inflation, only than inflation started to decrease, to reach one digit levels in the mid-1990. The SOE started to shed off the non-necessary activities, such as in-house food provision, summer resorts, or housing programs for the employees. On the macro-economic level, the output plummeted down. This had been forecasted, but not to the degree that it actually happened. Growth returned in 1992, and only in 1996 the per capita GDP reached its 1988 level. Last but not least, the SOE, finding themselves under a hard budget constraint, started to downsize and the unemployment, hitherto unknown, appeared on a vast scale. This was the most dramatic change, as it signified a return to a commodification of labor, a situation unknown under the job security regime of state socialism.
With the lack of security of employment, the economic system became a real market economy in the sense Polanyi or Esping-Andersen were writing about.
Thus, from the point of view of the -man from the street,‖ with Balcerowicz stabilization plan his/her real incomes decreased, while the feeling of insecurity increased. On the positive side, shortages disappeared and shops and stalls became full of goods. But this was not enough to offset the rising discontent of the public, which manifested itself politically in the 1990 presidential elections, in which previously unknown expatriate populist Stan Tymiński got over 21% of popular vote in the first round of elections, more than the first post-communist prime minister Mazowiecki. Two years later, in 1993, the Solidarity camp, blamed for the pains of reforms, lost the parliamentary elections to the former communists, now Social Democrats.
It is in this context of -anger,‖ to use an expression of Ost, that the -marketing the market‖ unfolded. The daily Gazeta Wyborcza played in this debate a specific role.
POLITICAL CHANGE AND GAZETA WYBORCZA
The political discourse of those contesting the system in the 1980s had been often employing the In the sixties, its representatives were active in the intellectual and student opposition to the regime, in the seventies they co-founded the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), gradually shedding the leftist ideology and moving closer to the human and civil rights ideas. In the eighties they continued doing so under the martial law and authoritarian conditions. Some of them were active in clandestine writing and journalism, so in a way the now legal Gazeta was just a coming out.
If Gazeta is to be classified in a simplified way, it would probably fit best into a -liberal left‖ pigeon hole. -Left‖ in a sense of an allergy towards ethnic, conservative, or religious nationalism. -Liberal‖ in the sense of the rule of law and human rights, but also its stance on the economic issues. But at the same time it had the Solidarity emblem printed on its front page and was somehow expected to represent the Solidarity Trade Union. Solidarity -which was much more a political movement then just a trade union -was unified only as long as the communist regime existed. Later, it fragmented into many currents, representing various interests and ideas of different social groups. Then, in September 1990, Wałęsa, as the Union leader, revoked the paper's right to use the Solidarity logo.
Still, in some way it was understood that Solidarity represented the workers, who were the ultimate force which led to the demise of communism in Poland. Arguing for reforms which in the short run went against the interests of these workers put Gazeta in a difficult position and gave arguments those who were critical about the intellectual elite gaining politically due to the support of the workers during the communist period and then abandoning them when communism ended.
The taking by the Gazeta editors a radical, pro-market position did not come out of the blue. It was a continuation of the several years' long process of shifting attitudes of the wider, This pro-market shift in attitudes was by no means a monopoly of the opposition intelligentsia. The same trajectory can be traced insofar as many members of the communist nomenklatura are concerned. Managers of SOE, specialists working for the state foreign trade companies, technocrats in various ministries, and also economic experts in the party apparatus were increasingly disillusioned not only with the command economy as such, but also with limited results of market oriented reforms. They might have stand in the politically opposing camp to the liberal intelligentsia, but were not far in economic views. Not surprisingly, in the period of Gorbachev's thaw they were supportive for the last communist government procapitalist moves.
Reading the Gazeta articles of the early 1990s, one has to remember that the focus of the argument was not so much market in general, as the reforms. In fact, among the general public the acceptance of the market economy might have been higher at the beginning of 1990 than a few months -or years -later. The most recent experience people had was with the state socialism in decomposition, with shortages, hardships, and uncertainty. There was no love lost, at least for a moment. Many people also had quite a lot of experience with markets. Polish agriculture remained private during the whole communist period, there always existed small private sector outside the agriculture, many travelled abroad for economic reasons, and -last but not least -there always existed a gray zone of hidden economy of a purely market character. In fact, quite a lot of -creeping capitalism,‖ to borrow the expression from Stephen Kotkin, already replaced dead wood of command economy, and not much persuasion was needed for its extension. 24 The real socially and politically contentious issue was the macroeconomic stabilization.
GAZETA ARGUMENTS
Gazeta Wyborcza supported the reforms from the very beginning with the pens of its own staff writers, by words of the economists engaged in the reform process, among them Leszek
Balcerowicz himself, and also by articles of invited authors. In its op-ed pages, it often published quite lengthy texts of a full page or so, thus giving its authors a considerable space to develop their ideas. Characterized in a telegraphic fashion, the paper arguments look as follows: The market economy is a well-tested system and Leszek Balcerowicz designed a good plan to achieve it. There is no sound alternative for either the market economy in general, or the Balcerowicz Gazeta seemed to reason in the Enlightenment spirit that no amount of effort should be spared for explaining the logic of reform, as much of the resistance is a result of ignorance. The rhetorical tools were a frequent reference to rationality and logic suggesting that no alternative existed, an often ironic and patronizing tone when talking about the criticism, and the warnings about the danger of derailing the reform process if their course wouldn't be strictly adhered to.
Of those writing for Gazeta, their own staff writers and -not surprisingly -the co-architects of reform tended to take a more radical position than invited commentators, some of whom were quite critical to the reform strategy.
The paper identified the obstacles to reforms as political and psychological. "Changing a system is a titanic job. To transform a socialist man into a capitalist one not only in desires, but in actions is even more difficult‖ -wrote Danuta Zagrodzka one of the Gazeta staff writers most engaged in the defense of reforms. 25 In another article she noticed in the society the lack of thriftiness, diligence, self-reliance, patience in climbing the career ladder, and business honestythe attitudes indispensable for the market economy. Instead, she was finding learned helplessness, waiting for outside aid, grievances, and bad working habits. 26 Thus, a determination in reforms was indispensable. "There is only one course to be taken -commented the Sejm decision to vote the Balcerowicz package Wojciech Maziarski, another staff writer. -A slightly different route could have been chosen, but you go for a treatment to a doctor whom you trust.‖ A system which was being replaced he characterized as printing of false moneyon a national scale.
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Ernest Skalski, also a staff writer, was straightforward in describing the desired model:
-From the beginning we took the assumption that we will not promote the imaginary solutions anymore, but we shall rely on the proven designs of the capitalist economy. Thus, the paper agreed that social costs were inevitable. As one of the authors put it, -it is not possible to get in a painless way through a breakthrough which faces us, if only because it 27 W. Maziarski, Co zamiast cięć w budżecie, GW September 2, 1991. 28 E. Skalski, Nowe idzie stare leży, GW October 26, 1991. 29 Skalski, Sprawdzian z konkretów, GW July 1, 1993. 30 Maziarski (author of many articles on reform) stated: -If Poland wants to become an affluent country with an effectively functioning economy, there is no choice -the teeth must be clenched and the costs borne.‖ Maziarski agreed that these costs were not equally distributed. However, a reconstructed, more efficient economy was the only way for the weak and the poor to improve their lot. Only the affluent would be able pay taxes, and thus to finance the benefits for those less lucky. 35 Thus, in line with the trickle-down economics, he was suggesting that higher inequalities were not only inevitable, but also necessary for growth. Even the recession was not without benefits. Skalski, in a Schumpeterian mood, was saying that the recession offers a chance of triggering the economic reconstruction process through the elimination of those firms which should disappear. 36 With time, as the social costs of reforms became to be felt, criticism and protests mounted and were taken up by political parties opposing the Democratic Union, Balcerowicz, and his economic policies. Gazeta became afraid that the reforms could be derailed, and its tone became more aggressive. -Our fate is still in our own hands -wrote Zagrodzka in March ‗91 -but the success is far from obvious.‖ 37 Maziarski, writing in November ‗91 and visibly irritated by the expressions of dissatisfaction in the media, commented ironically: -The society, harassed by for the state owned enterprises. 46 When Jan Olszewski cabinet took power (in December 1991),
Maziarski was asking rhetorically whether a less costly economic policy was possible. The new Prime Minister he suspected of believing so, but being unable to say anything else than -empty clichés‖ about a necessity of fighting recession and controlling inflation. 47 The reforms were also defended in Gazeta by their authors. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Gazeta Wyborcza was adamant in supporting not only the market transition in general, but also the particular form it took under the Balcerowicz Plan. In the process of convincing its readership, it argued, in a manner similar to the early 19 th century classical economists, that it was the only way to achieve an efficient economy and that the social costs and suffering -however lamentablewere impossible to avoid. In the longer run, the paper argued, the reform would benefit the poor as well. The critical voices it treated as either naïve and ignorant, or representing vested interests of those opposing reforms. In its rhetoric, it stressed the logic and rationality as characteristics of the reform projects, while often using the irony when describing differing views.
How important Gazeta argumentation was in persuading the broader public, it is obviously difficult to assess with any precision. In some ways, it was preaching to the converted. Of course, the domination of a neo-liberal discourse does not equal with a neo-liberal practice. This was much more complex, and while the subsequent Polish governments were usually keen to pursue macroeconomic policies more or less in tune with the monetarist prescription, they have neither reduced the welfare state to a minimalist social safety net, nor have they completed the privatization of state owned enterprises, not to mention the public services. But the reasons for the divergence from the neoliberal creed were rather political or pragmatic than ideological.
There remains a question why Gazeta was so decided to keep this radical pro-market course. The simplest answer is that the members of its editorial staff sincerely believed in what they were preaching, as they were motivated by their own vision of the desired future, which was liberal-democratic capitalism. They wanted reforms fast and swift, as they were afraid that pain and suffering would mobilize resistance. They believed that the sooner economic rebuilding produces success, the more the support for the reforms would build up. In the Enlightenment vein, they also believed that rational arguments had the force of convincing even those whose immediate interests were threatened by the short-term effects of systemic change. The danger they were the most afraid of was the right-wing, nationalist populism. Ironically, the type of policies they advocated actually led to the marginalization and social exclusion, with few provisions how to institutionalize the re-inclusion. Thus, as we see from looking around the East Central Europe politics, in the longer term they were leading exactly to what Gazeta was the most afraid of.
